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Extradition as a Tool                                     
for International Cooperation:               
Lessons from the U.S.-Mexico Relationship 
EMILY EDMONDS-POLI AND DAVID A. SHIRK† 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whereas globalization offers limitless opportunities for criminal 
actors to engage in illicit activities, law enforcement agencies typically 
operate within strictly delimited national boundaries and jurisdictions.1 
Thus, in the era of trans-nationalism, cooperation through the use of 
international extradition offers a potentially promising tool for 
countries seeking to extend the long arm of the law beyond borders. 
The subject has been well studied by historians and legal experts, who 
have written insightfully on the historical and technical aspects of 
extradition.2 However, there is considerably less analysis of many of 
the practical and political considerations involved in extradition, and 
very few studies that explicitly examine the power relationships, 
strategic dynamics, and political considerations related to extradition.3 
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 1.  PETER ANDREAS, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 14 (2006).  
 2.  A review of available scholarly articles registered on Academic Search Premier from 
1899 to 2017 produced a list of 94 articles, 79 of which were generated since the year 2000. 
The vast majority of these articles are found in law journals, and focus primarily on legal 
procedure, due process, and human rights issues. 
 3.  Some exceptions include, for example, George Ginsburgs, Extradition Issues in 
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With this in mind, this article focuses on the use of extradition as a 
foreign policy tool, and considers when and how extradition serves as 
a mechanism for cooperation in international relations. 
Examining its use in the U.S.-Mexico context, specifically, this 
article helps to illustrate some of the legal, procedural, and policy 
considerations involved in the use of extradition. The U.S.-Mexico 
case is an interesting one because of the long-standing existence of a 
bilateral extradition treaty and the dramatic increase in the use of 
extradition between the two countries in recent years.4 
While there was a flurry of research on extradition in the U.S.-
Mexico context in the late 1980s and 1990s, there have been 
surprisingly few scholarly books or articles in the last decade or so.5 
Therefore, our work addresses an important lacuna in the literature that 
seeks to understand how and when the two countries use extradition is 
used as a foreign policy tool. The subsequent discussion provides a 
primarily descriptive overview of the use of extradition in the U.S.-
Mexico context. It is comprised of three sections: the first briefly 
explains the history of extradition, the general structure of extradition 
treaties, and the bureaucratic steps in the extradition process.6 The next 
section highlights some peculiarities of the extradition treaty and 
dynamics between the United States and Mexico.7 The final section 
provides a systematic examination of the trends in extradition between 
the two countries.8 Throughout, the authors rely upon the existing 
literature, official government data, and author interviews with U.S. 
and Mexican diplomatic and law enforcement officials. 
II. STRUCTURING COOPERATION: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL 
EXTRADITION LAW 
In order to understand the use of international extradition as a law 
enforcement tool, it is first necessary to review the relevant legal norms 
 
Russian-Turkmen Relations, 29 REV. OF CENT. & E. EUR. L. 437, 437–456 (2004); 
CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, EXTRADITION, POLITICS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).  
 4.  EMILY EDMONDS-POLI & DAVID SHIRK, CONTEMPORARY MEXICAN POLITICS (2d. ed. 
2016).  
 5.  A few exceptions include DANIEL S. MARGOLIES, SPACES OF LAW IN AMERICAN 
FOREIGN RELATIONS: EXTRADITION AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE BORDERLANDS AND 
BEYOND, 1877–1898 (2011); Sara Pérez Kasparian, México y la Extradición Internacional, 3 
AMARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 807 (2008). However, these examples pre-
date the dramatic surge in U.S.-Mexico extraditions that we document in this paper.  
 6.  See infra Part III. 
 7.  See infra Part IV. 
 8.  See infra Part V. 
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and procedures. In this section, we provide a brief background on the 
practice of extradition, and examine how extradition treaties are 
structured.  
A. International Extradition Treaties 
Extradition was used in ancient Egypt and evolved over time into 
a widely-accepted principle of international law.9 In the mid-1700s, 
countries began to codify extradition practices in bilateral treaties 
designed to establish the terms and conditions under which one 
country’s authorities would surrender an individual within their 
territory or possession to the authorities of another country.10 
According to Blakesley (1981), the term “extradition” was first used 
officially in France’s décret-loi in 1791, and the term began to be used 
in international treaties in the late 1820s.11 A content analysis of books 
dating back to 1800 shows that use of the term “extradition” in books 
surged to its highest point during the late 19th century, and has 
experienced ebbs and flows since the turn of the 20th century.12 
Historically, the use of extradition in treaties has been primarily 
bilateral and rested heavily on the principal of reciprocity.13 That is, 
most extradition treaties have been established to ensure mutual 
rendition of fugitives, and did not rely on mediation or enforcement 
mechanisms—such as international tribunals—to address grievances.14 
Instead, countries are expected to abide by a treaty’s established terms 
because failing to do so could undermine the prospect of future 
extraditions or cooperation in other areas of the international 
relationship.15 
Thus, the stakes involved in such an agreement are considerable, 
and there are major implications for all parties involved. In signing a 
treaty, a sending country agrees to relinquish its jurisdiction—at least 
temporarily—over the individual that is subject to extradition.16 In so 
 
 9.  Christopher L. Blakesley, The Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to Modern 
France and the United States: A Brief History, 4 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 39, 41–42 (1981). 
 10.  MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL98958, 
EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND RECENT 
TREATIES (2010). 
 11.  Blakesley, supra note 9.  
 12.  Includes references in a sample of millions of publications digitized by Google Books 
from 1800 to 2008, the most recent year available, based on an online search conducted on 
October 1, 2017. Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com/ngrams.  
 13.  Blakesley, supra note 9, at 44.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  GARCIA & DOYLE, supra note 10.  
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doing, the Sending country effectively agrees to surrender its unique 
coercive powers of the Receiving country.17 Meanwhile, for the 
Receiving country, the treaty establishes the terms and conditions 
under which extradition may be granted and the expectations of how 
the individual in question shall be treated.18 
International extradition treaties generally share a set of 
provisions that outline extraditable crimes, non-extraditable offenses, 
jurisdictional limits, rules for extraditing nationals, and procedural 
limitations.19 We will briefly discuss each of these in turn before 
examining the specific procedures used by the United States and 
Mexico for requesting or responding to extradition requests. 
In most cases, extradition is limited to offenses specifically listed 
in an international treaty. Until the late twentieth century, these crimes 
were specifically listed by name (e.g., murder, aggravated assault, 
rape, kidnapping, larceny, embezzlement, bribery, fraud, etc.).20 
However, it is now common for treaties simply to state that all felonies 
are extraditable unless specifically excluded elsewhere in the treaty.21  
All extraditable offenses must meet the standard of dual criminality.22 
That is, both sides must each recognize the offense as a crime, and 
demonstrate it as such by referring to specific local or national criminal 
statutes in the extradition documents submitted to their counterpart.23 
It is also common for extradition treaties to specifically outline non-
extraditable crimes.24  
Historically, the types of crimes listed in international extradition 
treaties have excluded military and political offenses.25 However, in 
recent times, countries like the United States have begun to distinguish 
between prosecutions that are motivated by discriminatory or political 
interests from those designed to punish criminal acts such as terrorism 
and other violent crimes, which may be political in nature, but are 
specified in treaties to be extraditable offenses.26 Furthermore, a 
number of countries deny extradition when the suspect faces capital 
 
 17.  Ann Powers, Justice Denied? The Adjudication of Extradition Applications, 37 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 277, 284 (2002).  
 18.  GARCIA & DOYLE, supra note 10. 
 19.  Powers, supra note 17.  
 20.  Id.  
 21.  GARCIA & DOYLE, supra note 10. 
 22.  Id. at 9–10.  
 23.  Id. at 9.  
 24.  Id. at 5.  
 25.  Id. at 7. 
 26.  Id. at 7–8. 
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punishment and/or life imprisonment.27 In some of these cases the 
treaties specify that extradition will be refused unless the Sending 
country receives assurance that the suspect will not be executed and 
that the maximum sentence sought will not approximate a life term.28 
It is generally the case that countries seek the transfer of suspects 
that are thought to be guilty of committing crimes in their territory. 
However, some countries’ constitutions allow them to prosecute 
crimes by their nationals committed anywhere in the world.29 
Therefore, provisions defining territorial and extraterritorial 
prosecution are an important element of most extradition treaties.30  
Similarly, countries often disagree over whether it is appropriate to 
extradite their own nationals, so many treaties also contain a statement 
that clarifies whether countries can be bound to surrender their own 
citizens.31  
Procedural limitations such as a prohibition on double jeopardy 
and respect for statutes of limitations are other common features of 
extradition treaties, yet here again there is not always perfect 
agreement, since some countries allow extradition for prosecution of 
the “same acts” but not the “same offenses.”32 Furthermore, some 
treaties privilege time limit provisions in the Requesting state, others 
privilege time limits in the Sending state, while still others make it 
clear that no country’s statute of limitations can prevent extradition.33 
International extradition treaties also commonly contain clauses 
that determine the distribution of expenses associated with 
representation, translation of documents and proceedings, and the 
suspect’s transportation.34 Furthermore, they outline rules regarding 
transfer of evidence, as well as the required procedural steps in a 
 
 27. Mexico is one such country. Ley de Extradición Internacional [LEI], Diario Oficial 
de la Federacion [DOF] 29-12-1975.  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  The rise of terrorism and drug trafficking has increased interest in this area, in cases 
where two countries have different laws regulating extraterritorial jurisdiction, cooperation 
tends to be difficult and infrequent.  
 31.  This is the case in Mexico. Ley de Extradición Internacional [LEI], supra note 27. 
 32.  Yvonne M. Dutton, U.S.–Mexico Extradition and Cross-Border Prosecution, TRANS-
BORDER INSTITUTE, U. OF SAN DIEGO (Dec. 1, 2004).  
 33.  GARCIA & DOYLE, supra note 10, at 15–16. 
 34.  Interview with a representative of the California Prosecutor’s Office [hereinafter 
CPO]. Interviews cited in this article were conducted under the premise of confidentiality. Out 
of respect for those interviewed, their names, and the dates of the interviews, will not be 
disclosed. 
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formal extradition request.35 
B. The Extradition Process 
In order to carry out an extradition, countries typically follow a 
set of strict procedures that is outlined in accordance with domestic 
law and, where applicable, international treaties.36 In practical terms, 
this means that the process generally unfolds through a well-defined 
set of steps in which the Requesting country formally requests the 
extradition of a fugitive or wanted individual from the Sending country 
in which they currently reside.37 As an example, the U.S. procedure for 
requesting extradition from a foreign country is outlined below. 
First, in order to begin the process of extradition, U.S. federal or 
state-level prosecutors meet with the corresponding law enforcement 
agency to learn about the nature of a crime and determine whether it is 
an extraditable offense.38 Because of the extended time and 
considerable resources required for extradition, prosecutors tend to 
pursue only those cases that are likely to end with a significant 
sentence.39 
Once a prosecutor decides to pursue a case, their agency prepares 
a “package,” which has two main components.40 First is the 
prosecutor’s affidavit, which explains the domestic laws broken 
(including punishment and any relevant statutes of limitations) and 
verifies that the offense is extraditable under the bilateral treaty.41 The 
second is an investigator’s affidavit, which explains the facts of the 
case and demonstrates that there is sufficient evidence (including 
copies of arrest warrants, photographs, other documentation and 
physical evidence) linking the suspect to the crime, and information on 
the probable location (jurisdiction) of the suspect.42 
This package is sent to the Office of International Affairs 
(“OIA”), the office within the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. See also Powers, supra note 17, at 284–85. 
 37.  Interview with CPO representative, supra note 34. See also Powers, supra note 17, 
at 284–85.  
 38.  Interview with CPO representative, supra note 34. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  In cases (such as Mexico) where countries refuse to extradite suspects facing capital 
punishment, the package must also include the prosecutor’s assurance that a guilty sentence 
will not be punished by death. Id. 
 42.  Id.  
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which reviews all extradition requests.43 Once OIA approves the 
petition, it is sent to the U.S. State Department (“DOS”) for its review 
and approval.44 Cases approved by DOS are forwarded to the U.S. 
Embassy in the relevant country, where lawyers convert the package 
into a Diplomatic Note to be sent to the Sending country’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.45 
National rules governing how the sending nation handles 
extradition requests varies, however they tend to follow a standard 
sequence in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reviews and 
evaluates the extradition request to ensure that it complies and meets 
the requirements set forth by its bilateral treaty with the United States.46 
If it does, the petition is turned over to that country’s Attorney General 
who presents it to a federal/national judge, who then issues a detention 
order for the suspect for the purpose of extradition.47 
The Attorney General’s office then works with law enforcement 
to execute the warrant and apprehend the suspect.48 Once the suspect 
is in custody, s/he must be presented with the extradition order.49 
Again, each country’s laws governing the legal options available to 
suspects will vary, but in most Western countries, suspects have an 
opportunity to appeal or make a case for why they should not be 
extradited.50 
Once the appeal process has been exhausted, either the U.S. 
prosecutor’s office or the OIA arranges with foreign law enforcement 
agency for the transfer of the suspect to the United States where s/he 
will stand trial only for the offenses included in the extradition 
package.51  
Clearly, the extradition process is both complex and cumbersome. 
It should come as no surprise that an average extradition generally 
takes six months, and more likely up to a year to complete.52 As a 
 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  This is the rule of specialty: U.S. prosecutors cannot add new charges against a 
suspect even if incriminating evidence is discovered later. This means that if the extradition 
process begins too early, a suspect may face only a limited number of charges and therefore 
serve a shorter sentence than s/he otherwise might have. Id. 
 52.  Id. 
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result, the two countries have historically looked for alternative ways 
to exchange suspects more expeditiously.53 
III. EXTRADITION IN THE U.S.-MEXICO CONTEXT 
An examination of how extradition is used in the U.S.-Mexico 
context is useful both because of the special relationship that these two 
countries share and because of the growing use of extradition between 
them since the signing of the current U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty 
in 1978. Below we provide a brief discussion of the historical 
relationship between the United States and Mexico and the 
implications for international cooperation through extradition. Next, 
we delve into the particulars of the current U.S.-Mexico extradition 
treaty and recent cooperation on law enforcement and security issues. 
A. Cooperation and Sensitivities in the U.S.-Mexico Relationship 
The United States and Mexico share a nearly 2000-mile territorial 
border.54 It is the world’s longest border between a developed and 
developing country.55 There is significant economic disparity between 
the two countries, with the average U.S. household earning almost four 
times that of the average Mexican household.56 Despite their economic 
asymmetries, the two countries are intimately linked together by active 
cross-border commerce and demographic ties that stretch well beyond 
the shared border.57 In recent decades, U.S. and Mexican authorities 
have worked together to build a strong relationship, forging 
agreements at all levels of government to promote cooperation on 
trade, natural resource management, environmental protection, and 
law enforcement.58  
 
 53.  A detailed discussion of the alternatives falls beyond the scope of this paper, however 
it is worth mentioning that diplomatic and law enforcement agencies on both sides have often 
worked together to exchange suspects using deportation and, more controversially, 
surreptitious surrender of suspects at a port of entry. Less frequent, but even more 
controversial is the use of extraterritorial abductions to obtain wanted suspects. This issue is 
discussed in greater detail later in this paper. Dea Abramschmitt, Neighboring Countries; Un-
Neighborly Acts: A Look at the Extradition Relationships Among the United States, Mexico, 
and Canada, 4 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 121 (1995). 
 54.  JANICE CHERYL BEAVER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21729, U.S. INTERNATIONAL 
BORDERS: BRIEF FACTS (2006). 
 55.  PAUL GANSTER, THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER TODAY: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (3d ed. 2016). 
 56.  JOAN B. ANDERSON & JAMES GERBER, FIFTY YEARS OF CHANGE ON THE U.S.-MEXICO 
BORDER: GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND QUALITY OF LIFE (2008).  
 57.  CHRISTOPHER E. WILSON, WORKING TOGETHER: ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES AND MEXICO (2011).  
 58.  ANDREW SELEE & PETER SMITH, MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES: THE POLITICS OF 
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Still, it is an understatement to say that the U.S.-Mexico 
relationship has not always been a cooperative one and, to this day, 
there remain a number of tensions, challenges, and sensitivities that 
complicate the relationship. Many of these date back to the time that 
Mexico came into existence in 1821, after a hard fought, decade-long 
war for independence.59 While the United States initially recognized 
Mexico and the original boundaries negotiated with Spain under the 
Adams-Onís Treaty, the two countries went to war in 1846, over 
territorial disputes related to the U.S. annexation of Texas.60  
By the end of hostilities in 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
redrew the U.S.-Mexico land border, granting the United States a vast 
swath of Mexican territory as reparations.61 Thereafter, multiple 
generations of Mexicans harbored resentments against the United 
States and remained on guard against further U.S. expansionism and 
intervention in Mexico’s affairs.62 With the U.S. ascendance to great 
power status, Mexico remained acutely aware and suspicious of the 
power asymmetry between the two countries.63 
Thus, for Mexico, cooperation on law enforcement and security 
matters has long been a sensitive topic. The prospect of U.S. police, 
soldiers, or intelligence officers operating on Mexican soil is 
something for which many Mexicans have little tolerance.64 
Extradition, which compels a citizen of one country to face justice in 
another, is clearly an especially delicate issue. As a result, Mexico has 
been historically reluctant to extradite its citizens to the United States, 
particularly in the face of several perceived trespasses on Mexican 
sovereignty by U.S. law enforcement in the pursuit of suspects.65  
Nonetheless, between two countries with substantial cultural ties 
and cross-border flows of people and goods (both legal and illicit), 
there is a real practical need to address the problem of international 
fugitives and cross-border crimes. Some of these challenges can be 
addressed through various forms of cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies, such as intelligence and evidence sharing, 
 
PARTNERSHIP (2013). 
 59.  PETER SMITH, TALONS OF THE EAGLE: LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
WORLD (4th ed. 2012). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Facing devastating war debt, Mexico subsequently agreed to sell what is now much 
of southern Arizona and New Mexico in the Gadsden Purchase of 1854. Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  JEFFREY DAVIDOW, THE U.S. AND MEXICO: THE BEAR AND THE PORCUPINE (2004). 
 65.  Dutton, supra note 32; DAVIDOW, supra note 64.  
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international legal assistance, and even cross-border prosecutions. 
However, in recent years, both countries have increasingly relied on 
extradition as a tool to aid law enforcement, albeit with different 
objectives and priorities.66  
B. U.S.-Mexico Treaty and Cooperation on Extradition 
The first extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico 
was signed in 1861 and identified twelve extraditable crimes.67 Like 
many such treaties, the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty has been 
amended and updated over time to reflect evolving domestic and 
foreign policies.68 For example, according to Zagaris and Padierna 
(1997), the original 1861 treaty came about after years of tension over 
the issue of fugitive slaves crossing into Mexico.69 The treaty, signed 
in the midst of the U.S. civil war and the year before Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg address, prohibited the return of fugitive slaves.70  
The 1861 treaty also established that neither country was bound 
to extradite its own citizens, a provision the courts generally 
interpreted to be a prohibition on the extradition of nationals.71 By the 
late 19th century, the practice of exempting nationals became an 
obstacle to cooperation in the face of frequent cattle rustling, 
smuggling, and criminal raids over the U.S.-Mexico border.72 The lack 
of an effective legal solution led law enforcement from both sides to 
pursue suspects across the border without government consent.73 The 
resulting tensions led to an amended treaty in 1899, which maintained 
that neither country was bound to give up its own citizens, but specified 
that the executive had the power to do so at its own discretion.74  
For its part, Mexico has signed over thirty bilateral extradition 
 
 66.  EDMONDS-POLI & SHIRK, supra note 4. 
 67.  The United States has extradition treaties with approximately 114 countries, while 
Mexico has approximately 35, plus over one hundred conventions that seek to normalize the 
practice. For a brief but informative discussion of the development of extradition policy in the 
United States, see Aimee Lee, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: The Deleterious 
Ramifications of Illegal Abductions, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 126, 132–34 (1993). See also 
Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America’s “Catch and Snatch” Policy 
Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 151, 154–55 (1990–91). 
 68.  The 1861 treaty was amended in 1899, 1902, 1925, and 1939.  
 69.  Bruce Zagaris & Julia Padierna Peratta, Mexico-United States Extradition and 
Alternatives: From Fugitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers—150 Years and Beyond the Rio 
Grande’s Winding Courses, 12 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 519, 519–627 (1997). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
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treaties.75 Mexico is also a signatory to over a hundred conventions that 
may have bearing on extradition.76 The United States is not a signatory 
to some of these conventions (such as the 2000 Rome Statute for the 
International Criminal Court, which was ratified by Mexico in 2005).77 
For countries with which Mexico does not have an explicit treaty, 
domestic law allows for extradition through comity.78  
Article 15 of the Mexican Constitution outlines the framework for 
the extradition of an individual, but expressly forbids the use of 
extradition against persons wanted for political crimes, enslaved 
individuals, and for other individuals whose rights under the Mexican 
constitution would be undermined by extradition.79 The 1975 
International Extradition Law (Ley de Extradición Internacional) 
provides the current regulatory framework and procedure guidelines 
for extraditions.80 As a general practice, extraditions requested by the 
government of Mexico are referred to as “active extraditions” 
(extradiciones activas), while extraditions requested by other nations 
are referred to as “passive extraditions” (extradiciones pasivas).81 
The current U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty was signed in May 
1978 and went into effect in January 1980.82 It consists of twenty-three 
articles that specify the conditions that must apply for a suspect to be 
extradited from one country to the other.83 For example, Article 2 lists 
the 4 extraditable offenses, Article 3 establishes the required evidence, 
Article 6 prevents double jeopardy, and Article 7 prohibits prosecution 
 
 75.  In addition to the United States, Mexico has bilateral treaties with Australia, Belize, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Ecuador, France, 
Greece, Guatemala, India, Italy, South Korea, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain, 
United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Interview with a former Mexican Government 
official, see supra note 34. Gabriel Mario Santos Villarreal, Instrumentos Internacionales 
firmados por México en materia de Extradición, 66 CONGRESO DE LA UNIÓN 1 (2009).  
 76.  Others conventions include 1933 Inter-American Convention on Extradition (ratified 
by Mexico in 1936); the 1948 Convention to Prevent and Sanction the Crime of Genocide; the 
1996 Inter-American Convention on Corruption (ratified by Mexico in 1997); the 2003 United 
Nations Convention on Corruption (ratified by Mexico in 2004). Id. 
 77.  Michael P. Scharf, The Politics Behind U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal 
Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 97 (1999). 
 78.  Ley de Extradición Internacional [LEI], supra note 27. 
 79.  Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CPEUM, Diario Oficial de 
la Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917. 
 80.  Ley de Extradición Internacional [LEI], supra note 27. 
 81.  Interview with a former Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations personnel, see supra 
note 34.  
 82.  See Extradition Treaty Between the United Stated of America and The United 
Mexican States, Mex.-U.S., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059.  
 83.  Id. Article 15 (on delayed and temporary surrender) was amended in 1997. 
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of cases where the statute of limitations has run out in either country.84  
Following previous iterations, the 1978 treaty specifies the 
circumstances under which countries can refuse to extradite a 
suspect.85 For example, Article 5 prohibits extradition of those accused 
of political or military crimes, Article 8 states that extradition may be 
refused for suspects facing capital punishment unless there are 
assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed, and Article 9 
establishes that neither country is bound to surrender its own citizens, 
but that the executive branch of each country may decide to do so at 
its own discretion.86 
In practice, Articles 8 and 9 have created the most serious 
obstacles to cooperation on extradition cases.87 As mentioned earlier, 
Mexico refused to surrender Mexican nationals to the United States 
until fairly recently.88 Disagreement over this issue led to tit-for-tat 
refusals through most of the twentieth century and in some cases had 
a detrimental effect on the broader bilateral relationship.89 Mexico’s 
justification in many cases was that it had the ability to seek justice 
using the domestic judicial process.90 However, actors in the United 
States frequently found such efforts slow and unsatisfactory, which led 
them to pursue alternatives such as irregular rendition of suspects.91 
Predictably, such actions were perceived as the U.S. using its power 
differential to violate Mexican sovereignty and had controversial 
consequences.92  
Another obstacle to cooperation was Mexico’s refusal to extradite 
suspects (regardless of nationality) who faced the death penalty.93 
Mexico outlawed capital punishment in 1975 and therefore insisted 
that any international extradition respect this law.94 The United States 
 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Dutton, supra note 32. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  DAVIDOW, supra note 64. 
 90.  Kasparian, supra note 5.  
 91.  Michael R. Wing, Extradition Treaties – International Law – The United States 
Supreme Court Approves Extraterritorial Abduction of Foreign Criminals – United States v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992), 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  435 (1993). 
 92.  United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). The most notorious case was 
Alvarez-Machain, which is discussed infra.   
 93.  Dutton, supra note 32. 
 94.  Capital punishment was deemed unconstitutional in 1930, but it was not entirely 
eliminated from state penal codes until 1975. That said, capital punishment can still be applied 
in Mexican military courts for the crimes of insubordination and treason. Id.  
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objected to this article of the treaty and put pressure on Mexico to grant 
exceptions so that it would be possible to prosecute drug traffickers 
and others suspected of perpetrating serious crimes.95  
These efforts were clearly undermined in the 1980s by the 
Camarena affair.96 In 1985, a U.S. DEA Agent named Enrique (Kiki) 
Camarena was conducting an undercover narco-trafficking 
investigation in Mexico, when a corrupt Mexican official is believed 
to have blown his cover.97 Subsequently, Camarena and his Mexican 
pilot were abducted, tortured, and murdered, allegedly with the 
knowledge and possible collusion of corrupt Mexican officials.98 The 
U.S. government, and especially law enforcement agencies, were 
outraged and frustrated by their perception that Mexican authorities 
may have been involved and were doing little to investigate 
Camarena’s murder.99 
Years later, under evident direction from DEA officials, U.S. 
bounty hunters abducted a Mexican doctor named Humberto Álvarez 
Machaín, who was accused of collaborating in Camarena’s torture and 
murder.100 This irregular rendition was eventually challenged before 
the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, but its legality was ultimately upheld.101 Not surprisingly, the 
Mexican government was outraged by this breach of Mexican 
sovereignty.102 At few times in the 20th century were the frictions 
between the two countries greater than at this time.103 
Ultimately, though, the two countries made significant progress 
on bilateral cooperation on extradition. While the two countries 
exchanged just thirty-eight suspects between 1980 and 1994 (eight 
from Mexico to the U.S., and 30 from the U.S. to Mexico), this number 
rose to a total of 147 extraditions between 1995 and 2000.104 Moreover, 
during that period, Mexico broke with the past by sending seven of its 
 
 95.  Interview with a former official in U.S. Attorney’s Office, see supra note 34. 
 96.  DAVIDOW, supra note 64. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Abramschmitt, supra note 53. 
 101.  Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.; Abramschmitt, supra note 53. 
 102.  Bradley Thrush, United States’ Sanctioned Kidnappings Abroad: Can the United 
States Restore International Confidence in Its Extradition Treaties, 11 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 181 (1994). 
 103.  Abramovsky, supra note 67. See also Lee, supra note 67; Abramschmitt, supra note 
53.  
 104.  Dutton, supra note 32. 
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nationals to face justice in the United States, a dramatic change that 
prompted domestic opposition and constitutional challenges to the 
international treaty.105 Bolstering executive authority, in January 2001, 
the Mexican Supreme Court affirmed the executive branch’s discretion 
to extradite Mexican nationals for foreign prosecution.106 Since that 
time, Article 9 has not posed a major obstacle to bilateral cooperation, 
as our findings demonstrate below.107  
To be sure, extradition efforts were temporarily set back when the 
Mexican Supreme Court ruled in October 2001 that the U.S. 
government could not extradite suspects who faced the possibility of a 
life sentence.108 The court reasoned that such a punishment did not 
present the possibility of rehabilitation and was inconsistent with 
Mexican law, and therefore considered it unconstitutional.109 However, 
for U.S. law enforcement this presented a vexing problem because, 
mandatory sentencing guidelines often included the possibility of a life 
sentence (e.g., thirty years to life).110 Not surprisingly, the Mexican 
Supreme Court ruling prompted vocal and coordinated opposition in 
the United States, with U.S. law enforcement officials calling for the 
Bush administration to take up the issue with their Mexican 
counterparts and perhaps even demand a renegotiation of the 
extradition treaty.111 The controversy was resolved when the Mexican 
Supreme Court reversed itself in 2005, reasoning that some Mexican 
states had since adopted the use of compound sentences that were the 
equivalent of life sentences.112  
Overall, the two governments have worked to ensure that 
restrictions in the 1978 treaty has not hindered the success of U.S.-
Mexico cooperation on extradition. On the U.S. side this has meant 
providing assurances (often by amending charges) to the Mexican 
government that a suspect will not face life imprisonment or the death 
 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  At the time, Mexico allowed a maximum prison sentence of 40 years, with the 
possibility of a 60-year term in special cases. Tim Weiner, Extraditions are Limited by a 
Ruling in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/20/world/extraditions-are-limited-by-a-ruling-in-
mexico.html.  
 109.  Dutton, supra note 32. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Hugh Dellios, Mexico’s High Court Decision Opens an Extradition Pipeline, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 18, 2005), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-12-
18/news/0512180245_1_extradition-requests-extradition-case-mexican-officials.  
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penalty. On the Mexican side this has meant providing assurances to 
the U.S. government that the executive, rather than the judiciary, has 
the authority and ability to determine whether the type or length of a 
particular sentence qualifies as life imprisonment.113 As we will discuss 
in greater detail below, the willingness of the two countries to work 
together to strengthen cooperation on extradition appears to reflect 
improvements in the overall quality of the bilateral relationship.   
IV. EXTRADITION TRENDS AND ANALYSIS 
Of the hundreds of extraditions to the United States in any given 
year, a significant percentage comes from Mexico.114 Indeed, according 
to data from the U.S. Marshals Service and the Department of Justice, 
on average about 1-in-10 extraditions handled by their agency over the 
last decade have been from Mexico.115 Thus, Mexico provides a useful 
case study for understanding how extradition works, when and why it 
is used (or not), and its overall utility as a tool for international 
cooperation in law enforcement. In this section, we first briefly look at 
general extradition trends between the United States and the rest of the 
world before turning to a closer examination of the overall trends in 
U.S.-Mexico extraditions, and the factors that appear to influence 
them.   
A. Recent Data and Analysis on International Extraditions to the 
United States 
It is worth noting that data on international extraditions is not as 
readily available as one might expect for at least two reasons. First, 
detailed information on many extraditions is generally not disclosed 
publicly because there are sensitive law enforcement issues involved. 
For example, some individuals subject to extradition may be under 
consideration as cooperating witnesses in ongoing criminal 
investigations.116 Second, extraditions are handled by multiple 
agencies that have different patterns of reporting, which may also 
relate to law enforcement sensitivities.117 For example, if a particular 
U.S. agency is working covertly with a foreign government’s 
permission, it may not wish to publicize extraditions that it handles in 
said country, either for law enforcement or due to mutually recognized 
 
 113.  In practice this has taken the form of accepting the argument that any suspect eligible 
for parole is not, strictly speaking, serving a life sentence. See Dutton, supra note 32.  
 114.  U.S. Marshal’s data demonstrate this, see infra Figure 1. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Interview with CPO representative, supra note 34. 
 117.  Id. 
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political concerns. 
With these limitations in mind, the authors reviewed detailed 
agency level data from the U.S. Marshals Service, the agency that 
handles the vast majority of international extraditions to the United 
States.118 As a general trend, the available data show that for the period 
between 2003 and 2016, the use of extradition to United States was 






FIGURE 1) and clearly represented a marked increase from the past 
(see Figure 2).119 It is also worth noting that within this same period, 
there was a sizeable increase. For example, while there were nearly 
400 extraditions in 2004, the number rose by well over 25% in 
subsequent years, peaking at roughly 600 annually in 2008 and 2009. 
The number of international extraditions to the United States remained 
at around 500 or more until 2014, when it dropped to less than 400 
extraditions again in 2015 and 2016. 
The general patterns found in these data raise questions about the 
factors that cause the number of extraditions to rise and fall. For 
example, to what extent are the trends a function of actual criminal 
violence, trans-nationalism, bureaucratic capability, political will, or 
other factors such as economic ties or power asymmetries?120 On the 
one hand, some point to growing threats from transnational actors and 
groups as a motivation for increased use of extradition, as well as the 
growing propensity of the United States to expand the 
 
 118.  Data from U.S. Marshals Service included detailed information from 2003 to 2016 
on the Sending nation, requesting jurisdiction, citizenship of the individual extradited, and the 
charge for which they were being extradited. Data for 2000–2002 were not available.   
 119.  While we lack comprehensive data on the number of extraditions to the United States 
before 2003, evidence from Mexico, infra Figure 2, may serve as a proxy for a broader trend 
that shows increased use of extradition beginning in the early 2000s. 
 120.  Note that the war on terror and the war on drugs have increased the propensity of the 
United States to seek extradition and otherwise expand the extraterritoriality of U.S. laws. 
GARCIA & DOYLE, supra note 10. 
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On the other hand, the data in Figure 1 suggest that the use of 
extradition may reflect partisan preferences or the strategy of a specific 
administration: the Bush administration appears to have been more 
willing to or more successful at using extradition as a policy tool than 
the Obama administration, which may reflect to different strategies in 
counter-terrorism efforts.123 Although addressing these broader 
questions falls outside the scope of this paper, the findings from the 
U.S.-Mexico case help us gain some further insight on the dynamics 
of extradition, and thereby bring us a step closer to explaining more 
 
 121.  See PYLE, supra note 3. 
 122.  Source: U.S. Marshals Service. 
 123.  Given that extradition is a lengthy process, it is worth noting that most of the 
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general variations in the use of extradition as a foreign policy tool. 
B. Data on Mexican Extraditions to the United States 
In addition to the case-level U.S. Marshals Service data, the 
authors also referenced data compiled by the Congressional Research 
Service (“CRS”), which include extraditions from Mexico to the 
United States handled by other federal agencies (e.g., FBI or DEA), 
and therefore presumably provide a more complete picture of the 
aggregated number of extraditions each year. The authors also 
reviewed documents from the Centro de Documentación, Información 
y Análisis, a research arm of the Mexican Congress.  According to 
these various sources, the number of extraditions from Mexico to the 
United States grew from just eight between 1980–1994, to sixty-one 
between 1995–2000, 148 between 2001–2005, 443 between 2006–
2010, and 397 between 2011–15.124 The dramatic increase in annual 
apprehensions in the 2006–2010 period is especially noticeable in 
Figure 2.  
FIGURE 2: TOTAL ANNUAL EXTRADITIONS FROM MEXICO TO 
UNITED STATES, 1995–2016125 
 
 
 124.  Note that the authors were unable to obtain annualized data referencing the period 
before 1995. These data are reported at somewhat uneven intervals because they come from 
sources using different time periods. See infra Figure 2.  
 125.  Adapted from Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea, “U.S.-Mexican Security 
Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond,” Congressional Research Service, Report 
Number R41349, June 29, 2017, p. 26.  
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Case-level data from the U.S.-Marshalls service shown in Figure 
3 illustrates that the decade-long surge in the number of extraditions 
from Mexico to the United States between 2003 and 2016 brought 
variation in the type of cases for which extradition was employed. All 
told, drug-related crimes were the primary offense in the largest share 
of cases handled during this period, as can be seen clearly in Figure 4. 
However, it is also noticeable that over the years there has been a 
growing number of cases involving other types of offenses, including 
homicide, sex crimes involving a minor, and other types of sex crimes.  
Indeed, during the height of U.S.-Mexico counter-drug efforts 
under President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), the U.S. Marshalls 
Service handled extraditions for 108 individuals wanted on homicide 
charges, fifty-five wanted for sex crimes involving a minor, twenty-
two wanted for other sexual offenses, and forty-seven wanted for 
various other crimes (such as alien smuggling, weapons violations, and 
assault). Hence, an important finding of this research is that the 
impetus to cooperate on extradition in drug-related cases likely opened 
the door for bilateral cooperation on other types of cases.  










Figure 4 further illustrates these trends: Nearly half (45%) of 
Mexican extraditions to the United States from 2003 to 2016 were 
cases involving drug charges, while roughly a quarter (27%) were 
cases involving homicide charges. As we will see below, this is a 
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different pattern that that exhibited in extraditions from the United 
States to Mexico. There are differences in the number and type of 
extradition cases in which Mexico extradited fugitives from the United 
States. Also, it should be noted that, according to the Marshalls Service 
data, a large majority (76%) of individuals that Mexico extradited to 
the United States during this period were Mexican nationals, while 
roughly one in six (17%) were U.S. citizens and the remainder came 
from various other countries. Hence, a key finding here is that in the 
2000s Mexico was clearly more willing than in the past to send its own 
citizens to the United States to face justice. 
FIGURE 4: TOTAL EXTRADITIONS FROM MEXICO TO UNITED 












C. Data on U.S. Extraditions to Mexico 
Based on available data from the U.S. Marshalls Service, there 
were 254 suspects extradited from the United States to Mexico between 
2003 and 2016. While these numbers represent a significant increase 
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over past practices, it was not as dramatic as that seen in the other 
direction: Rather than a continuous upward trend, we see more 
fluctuations in the yearly number of suspects sent to Mexico, and rather 
than dramatic increases in the hundreds, we see yearly variations in the 
number of suspects extradited is in the tens. Still, it is worth noting that 
overall, the United States was more willing to extradite suspects to 
Mexico. However, as was also the case with northbound extraditions, 
there was also a dramatic decline in the number of extraditions from the 
United States to Mexico in the last two years available, as the number 
of cases dropped from twenty-seven in 2014 to just seven in 2015.  
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FIGURE 6: EXTRADITIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO MEXICO, 















As Figure 6 illustrates, over three quarters (76%) of U.S. 
extraditions to Mexico from 2003 to 2016 were cases involving 
homicide, while the next largest set of cases involved fraud (11%), 
drug offenses (10%), and kidnapping (7%). In this sense it seems clear 
that, when it comes to extradition, there is a clear difference in the 
priorities of Mexican law enforcement compared to their U.S. 
counterparts. These differences and the possible explanations are 
explored in greater detail below.  
D. Analyzing Trends in U.S.-Mexico Extraditions 
As we have discussed, U.S.-Mexican relations have long been 
characterized by tension and mistrust, even amid their growing 
economic integration and frequent collaboration. The asymmetry of 
the relationship is often a factor that contributes to this dynamic, as it 
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contributes to an overbearing U.S. attitude toward Mexico, and 
Mexico’s frustration and reluctance to capitulate to the United States. 
A glance at the data shows clear asymmetries and differences, 
particularly in the number and type of cases for which the United States 
and Mexico have employed extradition in recent years. While this was 
not the case in earlier decades starting in the mid-1990s, there were far 
more extraditions from Mexico to the United States than vice versa.130 
By the 2000s, Mexico was typically sending more than three times as 
many fugitives as the United States in any given year, and most of 
these were Mexican nationals.131  
The priorities of the two countries also appear to be very different.  
Whereas the large majority of U.S. extraditions to Mexico involve 
homicide charges, these represent only a small minority share of 
Mexican extraditions to the United States. Among Mexico’s 
extraditions to the United States, nearly one in six cases involves 
sexual crimes (including those involving minors), while such cases 
represent a fairly insignificant number of U.S. extraditions to Mexico. 
These differences clearly suggest that the two countries have different 
law enforcement priorities. In addition, the ability of the United States 
to seek extradition in a large number and wide range of cases also 
partly reflects the resources and capacity to do so. Former Mexican 
Secretary of Foreign Relations personnel interviewed confidentially 
for this article noted that their U.S. counterparts were able to dedicate 
comparatively more staff and funding to extradition requests.132  
Yet, more than the differences between them, what is particularly 
striking is the extent to which there was a clear increase in the 
propensity of both countries to use extradition in the 2000s. This would 
not have been possible without a gradual rebuilding of trust between 
law enforcement agencies in the two countries after the troubled years 
that followed the earlier mentioned murder of DEA agent Enrique 
Camarena in Mexico. Building the trust necessary to repair law 
enforcement cooperation took several years, and tended to progress in 
fits and starts. The first signs of rapprochement occurred in 1996 when 
the Zedillo and Clinton administrations created a High-Level Contact 
group to coordinate efforts to combat cross-border narco-trafficking, 
which helped to establish regular meetings and communications 
 
 130.  See supra Figure 2, Figure 5.  
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Interview with a former Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations personnel, see supra 
note 34. 
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between law enforcement officials from both countries.133 
However, bilateral ties were damaged a short time later, when 
Mexico’s drug czar was revealed to have ties to the Juárez drug 
cartel.134 The relationship was dealt an additional blow when it came to 
light that U.S. law enforcement agencies had conducted an 
unauthorized investigation against the Colombian Cali cartel on 
Mexican soil between 1995 and 1998.135 Yet despite these setbacks, 
U.S. and Mexican officials were able to gradually build working 
relationships based on mutual respect and cooperation.136 
For example, Mexico demonstrated its good will and desire to 
work with the United States to combat drug trafficking in 1997 when 
SRE approved the U.S.’s request to detain and extradite Everardo 
Arturo “Kitty” Paez, a top lieutenant in the Arellano Félix 
Organization, arguably Mexico’s most powerful drug cartel at the 
time.137 Mexican authorities arrested Paez in Tijuana, but his 
extradition was blocked by legal challenges questioning the 
constitutionality of extraditing Mexican nationals.138 The Mexican 
Supreme Court’s decision in January 2001 upholding the 
constitutionality of extraditing Mexican citizens paved the way for 
Paez’s transfer to the United States just four months later.139 Yet 
without the preceding shift in diplomatic relations and clear political 
will on the part of the Zedillo and Fox administrations, it is unlikely 
that extradition would have been seen as the viable foreign policy tool 
that it became.  
Under President Calderón (2006–2012), U.S.-Mexico security 
cooperation reached a high-water mark.140 President Calderón made 
 
 133.  PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 71 (1st ed. 
2000). 
 134.  General Jesús Gutierrez Rebollo was arrested in 1997 and later sentenced to 40 years 
in prison. Tracy Wilkinson, Jose De Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo Dies at 79; Disgraced Mexican 
General, L.A. TIMES, (De. 20, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/20/local/la-me-
jose-gutierrez-rebollo-20131221. 
 135.  DAVIDOW, supra note 64. 
 136.  Importantly, the collaborative approach survived changes in administrations in both 
countries, as Presidents Bush and Fox sought to maintain strong bilateral ties. Id. 
 137.  Ken Ellingwood, Drug Trafficker Pleads Guilty, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2001), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/oct/12/local/me-56308. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Paez was the first Mexican citizen to be extradited to the United States to face drug 
trafficking charges. He was convicted of cocaine trafficking and criminal association, and 
sentenced to 30 years in prison. Later (after the arrest/murder of Benjamin and Ramon 
Arellano Félix) he provided information that proved invaluable to the dismantling of the AFO. 
Id. 
 140.  EDMONDS-POLI & SHIRK, supra note 4. 
EDMONDS-POLI & SHIRK - EXTRADITION AS A TOOL (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2018  1:15 PM 
2018] EXTRADITION AS A TOOL FOR COOPERATION 239 
counter-narcotics efforts and U.S.-Mexico law enforcement 
cooperation a top priority during his administration.141 Seeking U.S. 
material support for these efforts, Calderón negotiated the three-year 
$1.4 billion Mérida Agreement with President George W. Bush, as 
both argued that the United States had a shared responsibility to 
contribute to Mexico’s counter-drug efforts.142 In part because 
Calderón’s efforts relied heavily on the “kingpin” strategy of targeting 
top organized crime leaders for arrest in order to disrupt criminal 
networks, the use of extradition played a central role in the Calderón 
government’s efforts.143 Because of the lack of integrity in Mexican 
prisons, extradition provided a means to ensure that key organized 
crime leaders would not be able to continue to oversee their criminal 
operations from behind bars or even escape from custody.144  
The Mérida Initiative continued at a similar rate of annual funding 
under President Barack Obama.145 Among other things, the program 
bolstered U.S.-Mexican intelligence sharing to dismantle organized 
crime groups, Mexican judicial and law enforcement capacity, 
southbound inspections to detect illicit bulk cash and arms shipments, 
and investments in crime prevention programs.146 Thanks to the Mérida 
Initiative, U.S. officials regularly expressed great praise and 
admiration for President Calderón, frequently emphasizing his courage 
in the fight against organized crime, and one measure of the program’s 
success was the steady stream of extradited kingpins sent to the United 
States.147 
Under Calderón’s successor, President Enrique Peña Nieto 
(2012–2018), the total number of extraditions for drug-related offenses 
declined sharply from thirty-two in 2013 to sixteen in 2015, while the 
number of extraditions in other categories remained fairly constant. 
This presents a small puzzle, since it is reasonable to assume that the 
number of individuals wanted by the United States for drug offenses 
—which included Joaquín “Chapo” Guzmán at that time—would have 
 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  CLARE RIBANDO-SEELKE & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41349, 
U.S.-MEXICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND BEYOND (2017). 
 143.  Luis Astorga & David A. Shirk, Drugs, Crime, and Violence, in SELEE & SMITH, note 
58. 
 144.  Ken Ellingwood, Mexico Drug Suspects Extradited at Record Pace, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 30, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-extradition30-2008nov30-story.html. 
 145.  RIBANDO-SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 142. 
 146.  Eric L. Olson & Christopher E. Wilson, Beyond Merida: The Evolving Approach to 
Security Cooperation, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CENTER FOR SCHOLARS (2010), 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/beyond_merida.pdf. 
 147.  Ellingwood, Mexico Drug Suspects Extradited at Record Pace, supra note 137.  
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remained high, particularly in light of the numerous drug arrests made 
in the preceding years. Our explanation for the decline in extraditions 
for drug offenses, based partly on confidential interviews with U.S. 
government personnel, is that there was a deliberate policy shift under 
the Peña Nieto administration.  
On taking office, Peña Nieto initially took a markedly different 
stance from Calderón on the drug war.148 In an overt bid to move 
Mexico to focus on promoting economic progress, Peña Nieto took 
great pains to shift the narrative about Mexico from one focused on 
crime and violence to one more focused on Mexico’s economic 
achievements and opportunities.149 Peña Nieto also asserted that he 
would break from the Calderón administration’s focus on organized 
crime, and drug-trafficking specifically, in order to prioritize citizen 
security issues that directly affected ordinary Mexicans, notably 
homicide, kidnapping, and extortion.150 Peña Nieto also appeared to 
take a dim view of the Calderón administration’s close cooperation 
with the United States, in part due to U.S. spying on his election 
campaign.151 To keep a close eye on such cooperation, Peña Nieto 
administration officials that U.S.-Mexico security relations would now 
be more centrally managed through the “single window” 
(ventanilla única) of Mexico’s interior ministry.152 No doubt these 
shifts in policy had a dampening effect on drug-related extraditions in 
the initial years of the Peña Nieto administration.   
However, the Peña Nieto administration’s openness to U.S.-
Mexico security cooperation, particularly on drug offenses, appeared 
to rebound in 2015 and 2016. This may have been attributable to a 
number of developments that appear to have changed the Peña Nieto 
administration’s stance on counter-drug cooperation. Notably, after 
improvements in 2012 and 2013, Mexico’s security situation appeared 
to worsen again in 2014. That year brought widespread domestic and 
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international concern about the emergence of new paramilitary style 
organizations in the state of Michoacán, the military’s extrajudicial 
killing of nearly two dozen suspects detained in the state of Mexico, 
and the murder and disappearance of dozens of students and protesters 
originating from the town of Ayotzinapa in the state of Guerrero.153 
Such incidents put pressure on the Peña Nieto administration to 
continue its counter-drug efforts and beef up security. At the same 
time, U.S. government officials interviewed for this paper suggest that 
continued efforts to build trust and cooperation through the Mérida 
Initiative helped to increase the Peña Nieto administration’s openness 
to cooperation with the United States.154  
The most symbolic indication of the rebound in extraditions for 
drug-related offenses was Mexico’s decision to extradite Guzmán to 
the United States on January 19, 2017 in order to face charges in New 
York.155 This move was a surprise for many, given Guzmán’s high 
profile and the swiftness with which his extradition moved forward. 
Some observers suggested that Guzmán’s extradition was a salute to 
the outgoing U.S. presidential administration on President Barack 
Obama’s last day in office.156 Others saw it as a hedge against pending 
political changes in Washington, since Mexican officials viewed 
incarcerating Guzmán at home as a liability, but also felt less inclined 
to extradite Guzmán under a hostile Trump administration.157 Whatever 
the reason, Guzmán case was routed for prosecution to New York’s 
Eastern District Court in Brooklyn on a 17-count indictment, marking 
another milestone in U.S.-Mexico cooperation on extradition.158  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
As illustrated by the data presented in this paper, until about 1990, 
the number of extraditions between the United States and Mexico was 
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relatively small. This changed after 1995, when the number gradually 
increased, reaching unprecedented levels in the 2000s. Since Donald 
Trump’s election, however, the tenor and substance of U.S.-Mexican 
relations appear to be at a low not seen since the mid-1980s.159 The 
tensions between Presidents Trump and Peña, while not as intense as 
they were during the first two months of Trump’s administration, have 
yet to be fully repaired. Moreover, the two sides appear to be digging 
into their positions not to give in to the demands of the other. These 
stances do not appear to bode well for future bilateral cooperation on 
a number of issues, including extradition. Judging by the rhetoric of 
the current administrations, we might expect to see fewer extraditions 
during the next two years to four years.  
That said, it is also possible that things are not as bad as they 
seem. Indeed, there are a number of signs that Mexico and the United 
States are continuing to work together closely in the area of law 
enforcement cooperation. It may be that the diplomatic foundation 
built over the past twenty years by several presidents, and perhaps 
more importantly, by the diplomatic core and law enforcement 
agencies, is strong enough to withstand, and least in the short term, the 
storms raging in the White House and Los Pinos. 
There are at least two reasons to believe that Mexico’s 
cooperation with the United States is likely to continue. First, given 
Peña’s dismal public approval ratings and accusations that he has been 
slow to go after government officials accused of criminal activity, 
there are domestic political benefits to be gained from publicly going 
after corrupt government officials and violent thugs, especially as 
Mexico enters the summer electoral season. Second, there may be an 
interest in paving the way for cordial and constructive discussions on 
the future of NAFTA. In helping the United States achieve its goal of 
prosecuting nefarious characters, the Peña administration may be 
sending a signal about its desire to maintain cordial and cooperative 
relations in other areas—most notably, trade and investment. 
What is clear is that extradition is a process made more complex 
by the fact that it involves many actors, scarce resources, multiple veto 
points, and is sensitive to the national political climate.160 At the same 
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time, extradition is a valuable tool that can be used in a variety of ways 
by states seeking to advance their foreign policy goals, even in 
asymmetrical power situations. While further research is needed to 
clarify the depth and nuanced nature of the use of extradition in the 
U.S.-Mexico context, evidence presented here suggests that it serves 
as an important barometer of the bilateral relationship. 
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